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COMMENTS
A POST-Santa Fe BLUEPRINT FOR COURTS IN RULE 10b-5 ACTIONS FOR
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY: Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.
1979)
Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' the Securities and
Exchange Commission adopted SEC Rule 10b-5.2 Introduced without
much fanfare in 1942, the Rule's potential effect was not then fully appre-
ciated.3 There is no question that over the years the courts have inter-
preted the broad language of rule 10b-5 expansively,4 and while a great
deal of the law governing securities matters is reflected in circuit court
opinions, the Supreme Court has recently undertaken an active role in
determining the scope of rule 10b-5.5 In the recent case of Santa Fe In-
dustries, Inc. v. Green,6 the Supreme Court held that a breach of fiduci-
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the malls or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
3. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURriEs LAW: FRAUD-SEC RuLE 10B-5 § 2.2 at 19-20 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., .380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Ruckle v. Roto
Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
5. Bloomenthal, Introductory Survey, 8 SEc. L. REv. xii, xii-xiii (1976). See, e.g., Santa Fe
Iidus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975).
6. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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ary duty, unsupported by an allegation of manipulation or deception, is
not actionable under rule 10b-5.7 A number of courts have had the oppor-
tunity to interpret the Santa Fe decision and to formulate tests to deter-
mine if plaintiffs have alleged sufficient deception or manipulation to fall
within the ambit of rule 10b-5;8 yet there is an apparent conflict among
the circuits as to the proper application of Santa Fe. This Comment will
examine the approach taken recently by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals9 where the court formulated a blueprint for courts to follow in this
area.'
0
I. BEFORE Santa Fe
In an early case, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.," the Second Cir-
cuit stated that section 10(b) was aimed specifically at the type of misrep-
resentation associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than
"fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs."' 2 Birnbaum has subse-
quently been interpreted in varying ways by the same court,'3 and it has
7. Id. at 473-74.
8. Compare Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978) with Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979) and Wright v. Heizer Corp.,
560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
9. Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
10. The question of whether the rule or the statute creates a private right of action is
apparently settled at this time. These private actions, notwithstanding the fact that there is
no mention of them in the rule or statute, were first allowed in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The Supreme Court never addressed the issue until
many years after the Kardon case. Then, in Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas.
Co., the Court found that a private cause of action was implied under section 10(b). 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971).
11. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
12. Id. at 464. Birnbaum is primarily known for its establishment of the purchaser-seller
requirement.
13. Compare O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) with Ruckle v. Roto Am.
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). Although these cases were decided by the same court
within a month of each other, the results were not entirely consistent. In O'Neill, the Civil
Aeronautics Board had ordered a re-exchange of shares between Pan American Airlines and
National Air Lines. Plaintiff, a stockholder of National, alleged that National's board of
directors arranged the exchange so as to perpetuate their control over the corporation,
which allegedly was not in the best interests of the corporation. 339 F.2d at 766-67. The
circuit court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action stating that there was "no
serious claim of deceit, withheld information or misstatement of material fact." Id. at 767.
The court specifically relied on Birnbaum and held there must be an "allegation of facts
amounting to deception." Id. at 768.
Less than one month earlier, in Ruckle, the same court was faced with a derivative action
brought by a disgruntled stockholder to enjoin a corporation from issuing and selling securi-
ties to the president of the corporation. The alleged fraud centered around the withholding
of the latest financial statements of the company from the minority members of the board
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led to much confusion as to whether to allow an action under rule 10b-5
where there is only a breach of fiduciary duty and no allegation of mis-
representation or nondisclosure. There followed a gradual loosening of the
strict Birnbaum interpretation of rule 10b-5, and it became evident that a
transaction could be considered a fraud within the reach of rule 10b-514
even though not satisfying all the traditional requirements of deceit.15
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,16 the Second Circuit established what
was interpreted by many commentators as a new standard of "fairness,"
by which actions could be brought for a breach of a fiduciary duty under
rule 10b-5. 17 In Schoenbaum, the plaintiffs brought a derivative action
alleging that the defendants, knowing the true value of the stock, used
their control of the corporation to acquire 500,000 shares of the corpora-
tion's stock at a grossly undervalued price shortly before a public an-
of directors. 339 F.2d at 26. Although the court did not say the holding was based on a
breach of fiduciary duty, the court stated that "It]here can be no more effective way to
emasculate the policies of the federal securities laws than to deny relief solely because a
fraud was committed by a director rather than by an outsider." Id. at 29. The confusion
which followed in the wake of these apparently conflicting cases and their interpretation of
Birnbaum has not been fully settled by Santa Fe. E.g. Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th
Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978).
14. See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865
(3d Cir. 1968).
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 685 (4th ed. 1971). These traditional
requirements of deceit include (1) a false representation, usually one of fact, made by the
defendant; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant that the representation is false, i.e.
scienter; (3) an intention by the defendant to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from
acting in reliance upon the misrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; anid (5)
damages to the plaintiff caused by the reliance. Id. at 685-86.
16. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
17. E.g., Comment, 55 VA. L. REv. 1103, 1113-16 (1969). The validity of the O'Neill hold-
ing, supra note 13, was, thus, seriously questioned. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1974).
The holding in Schoenbaum became known as "new fraud," or an approach based on the
fairness of the transaction. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972). The case
signalled an awareness that the courts would be receptive to the idea that minority stock-
holders in conflict of interest transactions are very vulnerable to securities frauds which
would not be a threat to the ordinary stockholder. In apparent support of this position, the
Supreme Court, in Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971),
found the company was "injured as an investor through a deceptive device which deprived it
of any compensation for the sale of its valuable block of securities" because a group of
investors bought the company and then used company assets to pay for the transaction. A
theory of "new fraud" was adopted in other circuits. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792
(5th Cir. 1970); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,
380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
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nouncement of an oil discovery."" It has been suggested that the court
could have decided the case by simply disregarding the corporate fiction
and "[viewing] the transaction as a fraud on the shareholders." 9 Instead,
the court enunciated a broader rule than was necessary to reach the same
result. In essence, the court found that if the controlling shareholder
caused the corporation to issue shares to him at an unfair price, a fraud
was perpetrated despite the absence of deception.20
Four years hence, in Popkin v. Bishop,2 the Second Circuit was once
again faced with the issue of whether or not there must be an allegation
of misrepresentation or nondisclosure for an action to lie under rule 10b-
5.22 The court dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Popkin finding that, al-
though the court in Schoenbaum focused on improper self-dealing, it "did
not eliminate nondisclosure as a key issue in Rule 10b-5 cases. ' 23 Full and
correct information was given by the majority stockholder in Popkin and
since the court felt the securities laws and rules were "designed princi-
pally to impose a duty to disclose and inform rather than to become en-
meshed in passing judgments on information elicited"2" no action was
found to lie. Thus, the Popkin court appeared to limit the applicability of
Schoenbaum. Further distinguishing the two cases, the court in Popkin
found that there was nondisclosure in Schoenbaum,25 and that the federal
interest was satisfied when all information necessary for the stockholders
to make an informed decision was disclosed.26
18. 405 F.2d at 217-18.
19. Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggran-
dizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332, 347 (1969). This approach would have adopted the dissent of
Judge Hays in the case when it was before the three-judge panel. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1968) (Hays, J., dissenting).
20. 405 F.2d at 219-20. In his dissent, Judge Medina foreshadowed what was to become a
policy ground for the Supreme Court in Santa Fe:
For the result [of the majority's holding] is to transform a simple cause of action
against directors for waste or the use of bad judgment in the sale of corporate assets
into a federal securities fraud case by judicial fiat. In my opinion the Congress never
intended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to be interpreted so broadly as this.
Id. at 220.
21. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
22. In Popkin, the plaintiff was seeking injunctive relief on the ground that the exchange
ratios in the proposed merger between Bell Intercontinental Corporation and its two subsid-
iaries into the Equity Corporation were grossly inadequate. A joint proxy statement had
been issued which fully explained the merger and Equity's position as controlling stock-
holder. Id. at 716.
23. Id. at 719.
24. Id. at 719-20.
25. Id. at 719. Also, in Schoenbaum, prior stockholder approval was not required. Id.
26. Id. at 719-20.
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It was not clear in the Popkin decision whether the Second Circuit had
retreated to the position of requiring all the traditional elements of
fraud 27 to be alleged in order to establish a cause of action under rule
10b-5. What was clear, however, was that the Supreme Court had begun a
restrictive interpretation of the rule's provisions. In Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 2s the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
to uphold the "purchaser-seller" rule of Birnbaum29 with respect to im-
plied rights of action under section 10(b).30 Ever since the Birnbaum case
was decided, the trend of the courts had been to relax the strict "pur-
chaser-seller" rule established by that case.31 The Supreme Court put a
halt to this trend in Blue Chip by stating that "[t]he longstanding accept-
ance by the courts, coupled with Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum's
reasonable interpretation of the wording of § 10(b), wording which is di-
rected toward injury suffered 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of
securities, argues significantly in favor of acceptance of the Birnbaum
rule by this Court."32 Thus, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that
Congress had not changed the law after the interpretation given section
10(b) by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum.33 Blue Chip was a precursor of
27. See note 15 supra.
28. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
29. See note 12 supra.
30. 421 U.S. at 751-52. Blue Chip, before the action was brought, provided trading stamps
to retailers, and ninety percent of its shares were owned by nine retailers. Id. at 725. The
government brought an antitrust suit, and a consent decree was entered, by which Blue
Chip was to be reorganized into a new company. Id. at 725-26. The holdings of the share-
holders in the old company were to be reduced, and the new company was to offer a sub-
stantial number of its shares of common stock to retailers who had previously used the
stamp service but were not stockholders in the old company. Plaintiffs alleged that the pro-
spectus prepared and distributed by the new company was "materially misleading in its
overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and future prospects." Id. at 726. Plain-
tiffs alleged this was purposefully done to discourage participation so the stock could later
be resold at a higher price, and that the class before the Court was injured because it failed
to purchase the stock. Id. at 726-27.
31. Some cases have established that where a corporation issues its own stock it can be
considered a "seller" for purposes of rule 10b-5, and derivative suits may therefore be
brought on its behalf if it was defrauded. See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna, 380 F.2d 262, 266
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 27 (2d
Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). For a complete rejection of the "purchase-seller" requirement,
see Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973). See generally,
Ldwenfels, Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv.
268, 272-77 (1968).
32. 421 U.S. at 733 (citation omitted).
33. The CQurt also relied on other sections of the law, which expressly created private
remedies, in denying plaintiff's standing to sue under section 10(b), including section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1976), Id. at 733-34 n.6; sections 11(a) and 12 of the 1933
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decisions to follow.
Indeed, less than one year after deciding Blue Chip, the Supreme Court
decided Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.5 ' In Hochfelder, the Court enunci-
ated the rule that no action will lie under rule 10b-5 without an allegation
of scienter, i.e., the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part
of the defendant.35 In reaching its decision, the Court interpreted section
10(b) narrowly. The Court discussed in great detail the legislative and
administrative histories as well as the precise wording of the statute it-
self.3 6 Special attention was directed to the word "manipulative";3 7 the
Court stated that "[i]t is and was virtually a term of art when used in
connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful con-
duct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securities. 3 8 The Hochfelder Court found it partic-
ularly important to interpret the statute narrowly because they were deal-
ing with a judicially implied liability,ss and for that reason, following the
statutory language was a paramount consideration.0 Thus, since plain-
tiff's cause of action rested on the "negligent nonfeasance"41 of Ernst &
Ernst, there was no cause of action under section 10(b). 42
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1976); and section 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976). Id.
at 735-36.
Recognizing that a private cause of action under section 10(b) was implied by the courts,
the Court said "[i]t would indeed be anomalous to impute to Congress an intention to ex-
pand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it deline-
ated for comparable express causes of action." Id. at 736 (citation omitted).
34. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
35. Id. at 193. The defendant, Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm, was retained to audit a
brokerage firm's books and records. Plaintiffs had invested in a securities scheme which
later turned out to be fraudulent. The fraud, perpetrated by Nay, the president of the
brokerage firm, consisted of Nay promising plaintiffs high-yield returns from escrow ac-
counts which, in fact, did not exist. After Nay's suicide, the details of the fraud became
known through his suicide note. Id. at 188-89. Plaintiffs filed an action under rule 10b-5
alleging that Ernst & Ernst aided and abetted Nay's fraudulent scheme by improper audit-
ing procedures. Id. at 190. Plaintiffs alleged that if Ernst & Ernst had conducted a proper
audit, it would have uncovered the fraud.
36. Id. at 194-211.
37. Id. at 199.
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. See note 10 supra.
40. 425 U.S. at 200-01.
41. Id. at 190.
42. In so holding, the Court stated that "[w]hen a statute speaks so specifically in terms
of manipulation and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances-the com-
monly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects no
more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent
conduct." Id. at 214.
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The Supreme. Court, by its decisions in Blue Chip and Hochfelder, has
effectively limited the class of plaintiffs with viable causes of action under
section 10(b).43 These cases put a halt to the lower courts' trend toward
expansion of plaintiff's rights under the securities law.44 Further evidence
of the Court's reluctance to interpret implied rights broadly was con-
tained in a case which did not deal specifically with securities law. In Cort
v. Ash,45 the Supreme Court enunciated four factors which must be con-
sidered in determining whether or not a private remedy is implicit in a
federal statute which does not expressly provide one. The first factor is
whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted."" The Court decided that the protection of the
plaintiff in Cort was "at best a secondary concern. '47 The similarity to
Blue Chip cannot be avoided because the Court there refused to imply a
cause of action for a party who had not purchased a security, finding that
the congressional intent-under section 10(b) was to protect only purchas-
ers and sellers.
48
The second inquiry in Cort is whether there is "any indication of legis-
lative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one.'" Although it has been recognized that a private cause of ac-
tion may be implied under section 10(b), 50 this second factor may allow
courts to examine whether Congress intended for a particular plaintiff to
be in the protected class. Thus, there could be an even further restriction
of access to the courts by way of section 10(b).
The third factor requires the Court to consider whether it is necessary
to imply a remedy to effect the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme. 51 It is not clear if this factor, even though not explicated, entered
into the Court's consideration of Blue Chip and Hochfelder, and there-
fore required their finding that an extension of the securities law in those
cases was unnecessary.
Finally, the Court considered whether the cause of action was one tra-
ditionally relegated to state law so that an inference of a federal cause of
43. See generally, Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Secur-
ities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891, 892 (1977).
44. Id. at 900.
45. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). This suit involved an action for illegal campaign contributions to a
presidential campaign. See generally, Comment, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 53 (1975).
46. 422 U.S. at 78 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 81.
48. 421 U.S. at 727-31.
49. 422 U.S. at 78.
50. See note 10 supra.
51. 422 U.S. at 78.
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action would be "inappropriate. ' 52 The Court found that corporations
were creatures of state law, and stockholders invested their money with
the understanding that state law would apply, except where federal laws
required a different right or obligation.53 This fourth factor was not men-
tioned in Blue Chip or Hochfelder but was nonetheless, more evidence of
the Court's limiting of the class of plaintiffs under section 10(b), and it
was prophetic of what followed shortly thereafter.
The thrust of the Supreme Court's holdings in Blue Chip and
Hochfelder, in conjunction with Cort, was clearly to limit the application
of rule 10b-5. Thus, the Second Circuit's decision that "no allegation or
proof of misrepresentation or nondisclosure is necessary"" in actions for
breaches of fiduciary duty under rule 10b-5 was clearly ripe for reversal.55
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's interpretation of rule
10b-5 in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 5 and it continued its policy
of strictly interpreting section 10(b). 57
The Supreme Court pointed out that the Second Circuit opinion erro-
neously relied on interpretation of "fraud" in Supreme Court cases deal-
ing with areas outside the scope of the 1934 Act.5  Instead, the Court said
the proper place for determining what constitutes an action for fraud
under rule -10b-5 is to examine the language of the statute itself.59 The
52. Id.
53. Id. at 84.
54. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976).
55. The court stated that a broad interpretation of the law was necessary to accomplish
the purpose for which it was intended. The purpose, in the eyes of the Second Circuit, was
to protect the minority shareholders from the majority. Id.
56. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Under Delaware law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a)(1974), a
parent company with more than 90% of the stock of a subsidiary could cause a merger with
the subsidiary by approval of the parent company's board of directors. This "short-form"
merger required that the parent pay cash for the minority shareholders' shares. No notice to
or consent of the minority stockholders was required to effect the merger, but within ten
days after the merger the minority shareholders are to be notified, and any dissatisfied
shareholder may petition the Delaware Court of Chancery for payment of a fair value for his
shares. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. acquired control of 95% of Kirby Lumber Company, and
subsequently pursued the short-form merger. An independent appraisal of Kirby's assests
was made and Santa Fe offered the minority stockholders $150 per share. Id. at 465-66. The
minority stockholders claimed the shares were worth at least $772 per share and that a
fraudulent appraisal had been made, and therefore, Santa Fe was in violation of rule 10b-5.
Id. at 467.
57. This policy was first enunciated in Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185; see notes 34-42, supra
and accompanying text.
58. 430 U.S. at 471-72. See 533 F.2d at 1290.
59. 430 U.S. at 472. The Court at this point referred back to its opinions in Blue Chip
and Hochfelder.
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Court felt the Second Circuit's finding that all breaches of fiduciary duty
in connection with a securities transaction are actionable fraud would
"add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from
its commonly accepted meaning."60 Thus, the Court found that a claim
under rule 10b-5 could not be successfully maintained without an allega-
tion that the conduct was "manipulative" or "deceptive."61
The actions by the defendants in Santa Fe were held not to be decep-
tive or manipulative because the minority shareholders were given all the
information necessary for them to make a decision whether to accept the
price offered, or to reject the offer and proceed in the Delaware Court of
Chancery for an appraisal. 62 In a footnote of far-reaching proportions, 3
the Court answered the minority stockholders' claim that since no prior
notice was given of the merger, there was a material nondisclosure.6
Under Delaware law, the minority stockholders were not required to be
given notice prior to the merger, and they could only seek an appraisal
remedy; they could not have enjoined the merger.65 That being the case,
the Court said the disgruntled shareholders failed to indicate how they
would have acted differently had there been prior notice of the merger.6
Therefore, the nondisclosure in that case was not a "material"
nondisclosure.67
The Second Circuit relied on a number of cases6s to reach their deci-
sion, but the Supreme Court found them inapposite to the principal case
because all of them included some element of deception in order to come
within the ambit of rule 10b-5. 9 The Court also found that there was no
"manipulation" involved in Santa Fe because the actions did not fit
within the traditional meaning of the word; a word which was classified as
60. Id., quoting Hochfelder.
61. Id. at 473-74.
62. Id. at 474.
63. Id. at 474 n.14. See, Comment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1874, 1885-93 (1978).
64. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974).
66. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
67. The test for materiality was set forth in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976) as "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available." The Court in TSC Industries was deciding a case under the
proxy rules but the same definition was referred to in Santa Fe. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
68. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968).
69. 430 U.S. at 474-75.
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a "term of art."1 70 If Congress had intended to include the activities al-
leged in Santa Fe within section 10(b), 1' the Court felt that they would
certainly not use a word with such a commonly accepted meaning. 2
In the final portion of its opinion in Santa Fe 1 3 the Court intimates
that it would have reached the same result, regardless of whether the lan-
guage of the statute was dispositive of the case. 4 There were basically
two reasons for this. The first paralleled the third factor enunciated in
Cort;7 5 i.e., a private cause of action should not be implied where it is
"'unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes' in adopt-
ing the Act."'78 Having found earlier in the decision that the disclosure
was full and fair, the Court said that "the fairness of the terms of the
transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute.1 17
The second reason the Court considered focused upon whether the
cause of action was one that was traditionally relegated to state law78 a
major ingredient in the Cort test.7 The Court classified the facts of this
case as mere "corporate mismanagement,"'0 and said that such matters
are traditionally matters of state law.81 There was a reluctance by the
Court to federalize a great deal of corporate conduct which had previ-
70. Id. at 476. "The term [manipulation] refers generally to practices, such as wash sales,
matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affect-
ing market activity." Id.
71. The Court classified the activities involved here as an instance of "corporate misman-
agement." Id. at 477.
72. Id.
73. Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not join in Part IV of the opinion because they
felt it was "unnecessary" to the holding of the case. Id. at 480-81.
74. Id. at 477.
75. See note 51 supra, and accompanying text.
76. 430 U.S. at 477, quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977).
77. 430 U.S. at 478.
78. Id.
79. See note 52 supra, and accompanying text. One commentator has suggested that this
reason was one of the major reasons why the Court did not allow a broadening of the scope
of section 10(b) in Santa Fe. Note, 8 SaroN HALL L. REv. 762, 790 (1977).
80. 430 U.S. at 477.
81. Id. at 479-80. As noted previously, note 56 supra, when the Court decided Santa Fe
under established Delaware law, the minority shareholder's only alternative to accepting the
cash offered was to seek an appraisal of the fair value of the shares. See Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). Subsequent to the Santa Fe decision, how-
ever, the Delaware court decided that under a long-form merger, an appraisal was not the
sole remedy when the only purpose of the merger was elimination of minority interest.
Singer v. Magnavox, Inc., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). But cf. Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) (merger made primarily to advance business purpose
of the majority stockholder). It is not clear at this time whether short-form mergers will be
subject to the same test. See generally, Note, 8 SETON HALL L. REv. 712 (1977).
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ously been left to the states. This did not mean state law would control
where Congress has created a federal remedy, but the Court did not feel
the Santa Fe case called for such a federal remedy.82 The Court was obvi-
ously concerned that a wide variety of cases normally left to the states
would be brought under rule 10b-5, and there existed a "danger of vexa-
tious litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of plain-
tiffs under Rule 10b-5.""5 Also, the Court feared that directors of corpora-
tions would not know what responsibilities they had, nor to whom these
responsibilities were owed.84 Because laws differ from state to state, the
federal courts would be required to federalize the fiduciary duty in order
to promote uniformity throughout the country."5 Clearly, the Court de-
sired to avoid such a result.88
II. BEYOND Santa Fe
In the wake of Santa Fe, many courts have been faced with a myriad of
problems to which Santa Fe may apply, and the lower courts have inter-
preted the case in different ways.87 The difference of opinion on how to
interpret Santa Fe is nowhere clearer than between the Second Circuits
on the one hand, and the Seventh 9 and Ninth90 Circuits on the other.9 1
82. 430 U.S. at 478.
83. Id. at 479, quoting Blue Chip.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 479 n.16.
86. For a discussion of the continuing viability of "new fraud," supra note 17, see Jacobs,
How Santa Fe Affects lOb-5"s Proscriptions Against Corporate Mismanagement, 6 SEC.
REG. L.J. 3, 16-20 (1978).
87. Compare O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir.
1979)(holding that Santa Fe instructed courts to be reluctant in applying rule 10b-5 and
that plaintiffs had chosen to delegate their decision-making power to the bank; additionally,
abuse of discretion found to be a state cause of action); Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d
400 (3d Cir. 1978)(failure to disclose a breach of fiduciary duty is not a misrepresentation
sufficient to constitute a violation of section 10(b); to hold otherwise would circumvent the
holding of Santa Fe); Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 460 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(fail-
ure to disclose actual subjective purpose in connection with stock dealings is not a violation
of rule 10b-5); and Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(disclosure made
to disinterested directors held sufficient disclosure for Act, and involved a state cause of
action which the court did not want to federalize contra to spirit of Santa Fe) with SEC v.
Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)(distinguished Santa Fe because stock-
holders may have been able to enjoin the merger under state law); Healey v. Catalyst Recov-
ery of Pa., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Pa. 1979)(availability of injunctive relief enough to
distinguish Santa Fe); and Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(plaintiff's
allegation that there was no full and complete disclosure found enough to distinguish Santa
Fe).
88. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
89. Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
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As will be explained below, depending on which test prevails, a number of
causes of action under section 10(b) could be lost by plaintiffs claiming a
breach of fiduciary duty.
The Second Circuit in Goldberg v. Meridor92 was faced with an action
by a minority stockholder of a subsidiary alleging that a parent corpora-
tion, saddled with debt, forced its profitable subsidiary to purchase shares
of the parent company at an inflated price.93 Because the directors failed
to disclose the transaction in advance, the minority shareholders of the
subsidiary brought an action under rule 10b-5. The court reviewed its
cases decided before Santa Fe94 and decided that the Supreme Court had
done nothing to upset those prior decisions. The court then found that an
action could have been maintained by the plaintiff under state law to en-
join the parent company from forcing the subsidiary to buy the parent
company's stock at an unfair price.95 Without even determining the likeli-
hood of plaintiff winning such an injunction, the court said it would not
dismiss the complaint.9 By finding injunctive relief to be available,97 the
court distinguished Goldberg from Santa Fe in which the Supreme Court
found there was nothing the minority stockholders could have done had
they known of the "freeze-out" merger in advance.9
In Wright v. Heizer Corporation,9" the Seventh Circuit took a some-
what different approach to a similar problem. In that case, the defendant,
a controlling stockholder, demanded and received security for a loan he
made to the company. 00 Like the Second Circuit in Goldberg, the Wright
(1978).
90. Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
91. See also Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., - F.2d - (3d Cir. 1980).
92. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
93. Id. at 211.
94. Id. at 215.
95. Id. at 219-20.
96. Id. at 220-21.
7. In dissent, Judge Meskill disagreed with the majority's holding because the plaintiff
failed to allege what course of action he would have taken had he known of the alleged fraud
before it took place. Judge Meskill felt such an allegation must be made because of Santa
Fe. 567 F.2d at 224 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Also, because of the possible conflicts of law
question which could have been involved in a state injunctive action due to the multina-
tional corporate defendants, Judge Meskill was not convinced that New York law should
even determine the availability of injunctive relief. Id. at n.9.
98. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
99. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). The Wright court was
faced with five very complex transactions. Only the fifth transaction, where the defendant
obtained a pledge of company assets before he would make a loan to the company, will be
considered for purposes of this comment.
100. The security was all of the stock of Talent and Residuals, Inc., which provided ad-
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court looked first to see whether an action would have existed under state
law to enjoin the pledge transaction.1 1 The court found such an action
would exist but took an additional step: they looked to the facts of the
case and the applicable state law governing the transaction in question to
see if the state court would have actually enjoined the pledging of the
assets of the company. 102 The transaction was found to be unfair accord-
ing to state law and, therefore, the defendant was in violation of rule 10b-
5 by failing adequately to alert the minority stockholders.0 3
III. A BLUEPRINT FOR FUTURE COURTS
Just recently, the Ninth Circuit formulated what can be viewed as a
blueprint for future courts to follow in this area of rule 10b-5 actions af-
ter Santa Fe. The facts in Kidwell v. Meikle104 were important to the
decision entered by the court and deserve explication at this point. The
board of directors of an Idaho non-profit membership corporation ("re-
sort"), because of financial difficulties, voted to sell its assets and transfer
its liabilities to a Wyoming corporation in exchange for a minority inter-
est in the Wyoming corporation. The Idaho corporation had been formed
to operate a ski resort for its members on U.S. Forest Service land. Two
years later, a for-profit corporation ("sister" corporation) was organized
to build housing at the foot of the slopes, and thirty-two members of the
resort became stockholders in the sister corporation. The resort's mem-
bers and board were not informed of this development, nor were they
aware that some of the shareholders included the founder of the resort,
the attorney for both corporations, and some members of the resort's
board. The sister corporation then obtained a lease for twenty-five years
on the condominium lodge which the resort owned. The resort was to op-
erate the lodge year round, which was alleged to be very disadvantageous
to the resort. The sister corporation did agree to retire a loan which was
used to build the lodge. The members who were not allowed to partici-
pate in the sister corporation were very vocal in their opposition to the
entire arrangement.
Later, an Ohio businessman made an offer to buy the assets and as-
sume the liabilities of the resort. Subsequently, the offer was extended to
vertising agencies with complex bookkeeping and payroll services for ensuring proper pay-
ment to actors who appeared in commercials. 560 F.2d at 241. Note that no shareholder
approvals were required in this case under the applicable law.
101. Id. at 250-51.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
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,include the purchase of the sister corporation. At about this time, the
resort was having financial difficulties, and it was characterized as "about
out of business" 10 5 by its auditor. On account of these dire financial
straights, Idaho law allowed the corporation's assets to be sold without
shareholder approval.108 Nonetheless, a stockholder meeting was held for
an advisory vote. Fewer than one-half of the stockholders attended the
meeting. The plaintiffs alleged that the members were not informed that
some directors of the resort were shareholders of the sister corporation,
that one director may have served as counsel to both corporations, and
that some directors had assumed personal liability for corporate debts.
Had a vote been required under state law, the proposal to sell the assets
would have been defeated because less than two-thirds of those present
voted in favor of the sale.
Negotiations continued, and eventually the Ohio businessman bought
the resort. The decision to sell came from the board on an eight to seven
vote. Four of the directors who voted to sell the assets were shareholders
in the sister corporation, and two directors in the majority had assumed
personal liability for the resort's debts. The court dismissed a number of
parties for various reasons107 and then proceeded to an examination of
Santa Fe.
The Kidwell court recognized that Santa Fe was clearly a limitation on
the applicability of rule 10b-5 but stated it did not mean "that every
breach of fiduciary duties is necessarily immune from invocation of the
rule."108 The court then reinforced that statement by referring to the de-
cisions in Goldberg and Wright. Thus, the court found "there is room for
Rule 10b-5 liability after Santa Fe Industries even when the only
deceived parties are shareholders who are not entitled to vote on the
transaction in question, and even though there may be a breach of fiduci-
ary duty under state law."11 9 The deciding factor for the court, as it was
105. Id. at 1279.
106. IDAHO CODE § 30-145(2)(1976).
107. The Attorney General of Idaho and the beneficiaries of the resort were dismissed
because they lacked standing under Blue Chip since none of them were purchasers or sellers
of securities. 597 F.2d at 1286-87. Two directors of the resort who were suing on behalf of
the residual charitable, recreational and educational beneficiaries were also dismissed be-
cause the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not allow for that type of director derivative
suit, and because they were not purchasers or sellers under Blue Chip. Id. at 1288. The
plaintiffs also sought mandamus against certain federal officials and agencies, alleging that
they participated in the violation of rule 10b-5. The court found the action premature be-
cause it was based on contingencies, and it was therefore not ripe for adjudication. Id. at
1288-89.
108. Id. at 1291.
109. Id. at 1292.
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for the other circuits in Goldberg and Wright, was the existence of state
law remedies as the distinguishing factor from Santa Fe. In the instant
case, shareholders of the resort may have been able to bring a derivative
action to enjoin the sale of the resort's assets had all the facts been
presented. 10 Therefore, the first part of the court's test is to be the avail-
ability of an action under state law.
After deciding the Idaho courts would have entertained a suit for
breach of fiduciary duty against the directors who voted for the sale of
the resort's assets to the Ohio businessman, the court applied the second
part of its blueprint: was it a material fact which was not disclosed?'" In
its approach to this problem, the court used the oft-quoted language from
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 2 i.e., was there "a substantial
likelihood that [its] disclosure . . . would have been viewed by the rea-
sonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of informa-
tion made available."1 3 The court had no difficulty in deciding that a
reasonable minority shareholder would want to know if four directors had
some ownership in the sister corporation in deciding whether to bring an
action to enjoin the transactions in state court."14
The third part of the court's test deals with causation. The court points
out that the trial court on remand should presume that since the nondis-
closure was material, there was reliance by the minority stockholders.
This follows the holding of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States."5
But the court hastens to add the caveat that such a presumption does
"not dispose of the entire element of causation in the Rule 10b-5 suit,
110. The court said the minority stockholders "reasonably could have brought a well-
pleaded derivative suit to block the sale of [the resort's] assets." Id. at 1292. IDAHO CODE §
30-142 makes directors of a corporation fiduciaries who may not appropriate corporate as-
sets for their own gain. In Weatherly v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, 492 P.2d 43
(1972), the Idaho court had found that a managing director-shareholder of a corporation
was liable for not telling his brother and sister, also shareholders, that he was negotiating to
sell the company before he bought their shares. Also cited by the court in Kidwell was
Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho 271, 353 P.2d 406 (1960) and a later case in which
the Idaho court granted injunctive relief. Knutsen v. Frushour, 92 Idaho 37, 436 P.2d 521
(1968).
111. 597 F.2d at 1293.
112. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
113. Id. at 449.
114. 597 F.2d at 1293. The court mentioned the fact there may have been other actions a
minority stockholder could have taken besides the directors' conflict of interest, but it chose
to leave that task to the district court on remand. Id.
115. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In that case, the Supreme Court, realizing the difficulty of prov-
ing reliance on undisclosed facts, said the withholding of a material fact "establish[ed] the
requisite element of causation in fact." Id. at 154.
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however."'1 6 The court noted the difference between bringing the suit in
state court on the one hand, and winning the suit on the other. Because
of Santa Fe, the court in Kidwell felt forced to hold that a minority
stockholder cannot recover on behalf of the corporation merely because
there could have been a cause of action in state court."1 Thus,
[flollowing the Court's discussion [in Santa Fe] of the primacy of state law
in remedying breaches of fiduciary duty, we hold that no relief is available
to [the minority shareholder] here under Rule 10b-5 unless a minority
member would have succeeded in getting permanent injunctive relief, or
damages in excess of an appraisal remedy, in the state-law action.'1 8
This is where the court differs from the holding in Goldberg. In Goldberg,
all that was necessary to show was that a state cause of action could be
maintained whereas the court in Kidwell required the plaintiff to show he
would have been able to prevail in a state-law proceeding before relief can
be obtained under rule 10b-5. Although it is a question of fact whether
the action would have succeeded, the court instructed the trial court to
decide as a matter of law any legal issues which would have arisen had a
suit in fact been brought. 1
9
The next step for the court was a reminder to the trial court to apply
the scienter requirement of Hochfelder. 20 Negligent conduct is not
enough for rule 10b-5 actions; therefore, the defendants could not be held
liable for not disclosing facts they did not know, even if they were negli-
gent in not discovering the facts. 2'
The last portion of the blueprint is the determination of which defen-
dants owed the duty to disclose material facts to the minority sharehold-
ers. ' 22 The same court had already set forth five factors which were to be
considered in defining the scope of a defendant's duties in a rule 10b-5
action in White v. Abrams." 3 There the court, struggling with the prob-
lem of trying to fit the duty into the concept of scienter, enunciated a
five-prong approach which was to be flexible in order to meet varied fac-
116. 597 F.2d at 1294.
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added). The court is referring to the second factor in Part IV of the
Supreme Court's Santa Fe decision, discussed at notes 78-86 supra, and accompanying text.
119. Id. The court compared this approach to that of a judge in an action for attorney
malpractice. See, Wellman v. Jellison, 593 F.2d 876, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1979); Chocktoot V.
Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977).
120. 597 F.2d at 1294. See notes 34-42 supra, and accompanying text.
121. 597 F.2d at 1294.
122. Id.
123. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
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tual contexts.12 The factors set forth in White are:
the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to
the information as compared to the plaintiff's access, the benefit that the
defendant derives from the relationship, the defendant's awareness of
whether the plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in making his in-
vestment decisions and the defendant's activity in initiating the securities
transaction in question.12
Following this approach, the court found that a number of defendants
were properly dismissed by the trial court, but that the directors who
maintained a fiduciary relationship and had interests in the sister corpo-
ration owed a duty to disclose the information to the shareholders. 126
IV. BENDING Santa Fe?
Despite the Supreme Court's broad policy statement in Santa Fe that
it did not want to "federalize" causes of action which were traditionally
relegated to state law,127 it may be that the lower courts have continued
to find causes of action under rule 10b-5 for breaches of fiduciary duty,
albeit by using a different approach. The approach capitalizes on footnote
fourteen128 of the Santa Fe decision which indicates there was not a ma-
terial nondisclosure in that case because the plaintiffs failed to indicate
there what action they would have taken had they been informed of the
freeze-out merger in advance. Of course, at the time of the Santa Fe deci-
sion, there was nothing a minority stockholder could do to prevent the
merger if the statutory requirements were met by the 90 % stockholder. 29
The circuit courts in Goldberg, Wright and Kidwell relied heavily on the
availability of state remedies as a major factor in establishing liability
under rule 10b-5 for breaches of fiduciary duty, although their interpreta-
tions varied markedly as to whether the availability of a state action or
the ability to prevail in a state action is the proper test.8 0
In Santa Fe, as there was no allegation of a material misrepresentation
124. Id. at 734-35.
125. 495 F.2d at 735-36 (footnotes omitted). The court alerts the reader to compare
O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) with Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24
(2d Cir. 1964). See note 13 supra. See especially the court's accompanying footnotes. 495
F.2d at 735-36 nn.16-18.
126. 597 F.2d at 1297. The directors of the resort who did not own shares in the sister
corporation did not owe a duty to disclose under rule 10b-5. Id.
127. 430 U.S. at 478. See notes 78-82 supra, and accompanying text.
128. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
129. See note 56 supra.
130. See notes 95, 101, and 117 supra, and accompanying text.
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or nondisclosure, the Court dismissed the action under rule 10b-5. In
Goldberg, Wright and Kidwell, there were allegations that material infor-
mation had not been disclosed. Although taking different routes to reach
what was essentially the same result, the circuit courts found room for
actions under rule 10b-5 for breaches of fiduciary duty.'3' The only differ-
ence between the circuits is the effect to be given the availability of reme-
dies under state law. The Goldberg court believed that it was necessary
only for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the state court would have en-
tertained a suit to enjoin the questioned activity of the defendants.3 2 But
in Wright, and more forcefully in Kidwell, the courts felt that because of
the constraints of Santa Fe, it was necessary not only to show there ex-
isted a state cause of action but, indeed, that they would have prevailed
in such an action at state law before an action for breach of fiduciary
duty can fall within the reach of rule 10b-5. 33
It has been suggested the Goldberg court was correct in its interpreta-
tion of Santa Fe.134 It is submitted that the opposite is true. The Kidwell
court was correct in finding that the minority member would have to have
succeeded in getting permanent injunctive relief in a state action before
rule 10b-5 would apply. The policy underlying Santa Fe was not to ex-
pand the class of plaintiffs under rule 10b-5 where the cause of action was
essentially a state concern. The complaints alleged in Kidwell were, in
essence, a breach of fiduciary duty. Santa Fe made clear that "the exis-
tence of a particular state-law remedy is not dispositive of the question
whether Congress meant to provide a similar federal remedy.""' 35 In other
words, simply because a plaintiff could bring an action in state court, he
is not precluded from seeking a federal remedy. But in Santa Fe, the
Court was unable to delineate where state law controlled and where fed-
131. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d at 218; Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d at 248;
Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d at 1292.
132. See note 95 supra, and accompanying text.
133. See note 117 supra, and accompanying text.
134. See Comment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1874, 1894-98 (1978). That comment dealt only with
a comparison of Goldberg and Wright but the same arguments could easily be applied to
Kidwell. The reasons set forth by that commentator include his opinion that the approach
taken by Wright would allow the federal courts to apply rule 10b-5 only if the transaction
involving deception would be considered unfair by the state courts. Instead, it is argued, the
judicial focus should have been aimed at the deception itself. Also, the Goldberg approach
would allow the questions of materiality and causation to be settled as a matter of law,
which in the opinion of the commentator would be a better result than having the federal
court predict what the outcome would have been in a state court. It was further contended
that the approach taken in Goldberg was better because it allowed for more stability and
predictability.
135. 430 U.S. at 478.
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eral law began. 13 The Court was, therefore, unwilling to bring activities
traditionally left to state regulation within the purview of the federal
courts by way of rule 10b-5 because to do so would be to create a "federal
fiduciary principle.
'137
Another reason the approach taken in Kidwell is proper is the Santa
Fe Court's reluctance to federalize a substantial part of the law where
state policies of corporate regulation would be overturned without a clear
indication of congressional intent.3 8' As in Cort v. Ash," 9 the Court would
not involve itself in what was essentially a state concern without express
intent by Congress." ° These concerns are what properly influenced the
Ninth Circuit in Kidwell. Another consideration, although.not mentioned
in Kidwell, is the threat of "vexatious litigation" which was a concern of
the Supreme Court in Santa Fe."' With the federal courts already
overburdened, this must have been considered by the Ninth Circuit in
following the spirit of Santa Fe.
The Ninth Circuit was confronted with the following policy decision: is
it desirable to require a plaintiff to prove he would have prevailed in a
state law action before the courts will allow a rule 10b-5 action for breach
of fiduciary duty? Mindful of the strong policy of Santa Fe against the
federalization of what are essentially state interests, the Ninth Circuit in
Kidwell properly felt constrained by Santa Fe to hold that plaintiff must
have been able to prevail in the state law action.
V. CONCLUSION
Although it appears the circuit courts have relied too heavily on foot-
note fourteen of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, it is submit-
ted that the approach taken by the circuits in Wright and Kidwell repre-
sents a truer adherence to the spirit of Santa Fe. The policy against
federalizing what are essentially state causes of action, the desire not to
become entangled in vexatious litigation, and the reluctance to imply a
136. Id.
137. Id. at 478-79. The Court pointed out that one possible difficulty could arise where
some states allow for short-form mergers and others do not. Therefore, it would be neces-
sary to depart from a state standard of fiduciary duty to "ensure uniformity within the
federal system." Id. at 479 n.16.
138. Id. at 479.
139. See notes 45-53 supra, and accompanying text.
140. 430 U.S. at 479. Again, note that private actions under rule 10b-5 are implied, as
they were not expressly created by Congress. See note 10 supra. See also the discussion of
implied causes of action under federal statites in Cort v. Ash, notes 45-53 supra, and ac-
companying text.
141. 430 U.S. at 479.
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federal cause of action absent clear congressional intent to do so were
correctly interpreted by the Kidwell court as evidencing a reluctance to
extend further the reach of rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court has not
deemed it desirable to end the split of authority among the circuits as to
which test to apply. If certiorari is granted, however, to a future case, the
blueprint enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Kidwell best follows the
spirit of Santa Fe.
Richard L. Sisisky
